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This paper aims to answer the following question: whether delegation has value 
when the vertical contracts between the principal and the distributor are 
unobservable to outside party. Katz (1991) claimed that delegation has no effects 
on the final equilibrium in such a setting when a two part tariff pricing method is 
adopted to perfectly align the interest of the upstream firms and distributors, even 
if the firms compete for more than one period. This paper aims to reinterpret 
Katz’s conclusion and reinvestigate whether delegation brings any changes to the 
final equilibrium in such an environment. By using particular beliefs but otherwise 
keeping Katz’s assumptions unchanged, we show that delegation can still be 
profitable even if the contracts are not observed (although delegation cannot 
change the final equilibrium, it does increase the profit of the principal). Once we 
allow the distributor to have a  different degree of patience from the principal, not 
only can the principal benefit from delegation but Katz’s proposition that 
delegation has no effects on the final equilibrium no longer holds. In conclusion, 
we show that delegation can bring changes to the final outcome with the use of 
particular beliefs and allowing varying degrees of patience because the distributor 








It is not uncommon to see distributors are used to help the producers sell the goods in 
the retailing market. For establishing such delegation relationships, there must be 
competitive advantages or monetary incentives. The contract arrangements signed by 
the producers and the distributors are generally unobservable to outside rivals. 
Against this background, a problem naturally arises: whether the delegation under 
unobservable contracts is valuable in measure of profits to the producers and whether 
it will change the final equilibrium outcomes of the game. 
         Katz (1991) claimed that delegation, under unobservable contracts assigned by 
the upstream firms and the downstream firms, has no effects on the final results in 
terms of any Nash Equilibrium if a two part tariff pricing method is taken to align the 
interests of the principal and the agent. The equilibrium price is found to be 
equivalent to the marginal producing cost where no delegation is used. In this sense, 
delegation can bring no additional profits to the principal and thus having no value. 
The principal and the agent are supposed to be rational in Katz’s model so that their 
forecasts are always correct. However, Katz did not address what happens in the early 
round of competition or whether the principal is better off by using delegation, nor did 
he show whether the conclusion still holds when the principal and the agent have 
varying degrees of patience instead of uniform preference. 
        This paper tries to reexamine the value of the unobservable contracts and its 
effects on the equilibrium in the following ways. The first way is to introduce varying 
degrees of patience into the model, with an intention to investigate whether such 
disparity of preferences will change the equilibrium; the second way for 
reexamination is to apply particular beliefs which are varying with early round results 
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instead of simply supposing a fixed equilibrium value; we finally include both 
assumptions into our model to check their combined effects. The following is the 
competition story. 
        Two upstream firms  21,UU are supposed producing the goods in the upstream 
market and only one of them (here, we suppose 1U ) delegates the goods to a 
distributor 1D .Two stages are involved in the game. The first stage is called contract 
stage. 1U offers a contract concerning the wholesale price and franchise 
fee  Fw, to 1D , as long as sD
'
1  profit is nonnegative in equilibrium, he will accept the 
offer. The second stage includes two rounds of competition. In the first round, 
2U competes directly with 1D in the retailing market in terms of quantity  21,rr . Before 
they enter into the second round of competition, 2U forms some expectations about 
the wholesale price w which may or may not be based on the first round results he 
observed which will be decided by our assumptions in different model parts. By 
taking the beliefs into consideration, 2U  and 1D compete again in terms of 
quantity  21,qq .  
        By comparing the results we acquired under newly supposed conditions with 
those generated from typical Cournot competition, we try to find out whether 
delegation can bring the principal extra profits in addition to Cournot profits and 
whether the Cournot outcomes still hold in terms of Nash Equilibrium. 
        The model is divided into two parts. We suppose passive beliefs in the first part 
of the model, implying that beliefs about the equilibrium value hold by the outsider 
producer will not be altered by what he observed. Assuming the same degree of 
patience of all the players, we have reached a conclusion that is consistent with what 
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was claimed by Katz who showed that delegation cannot exert any effects on the final 
round game results in terms of Nash Equilibrium. 
        However, by adding a discount rate to the distributor but no discount rate to the 
two producers, we arrived at a totally different conclusion. All the results in two 
stages, the contract stage and the competition stage have been significantly altered. A 
high level of patience for the future payoffs of the distributor results in two 
differences compared with the original outcomes when no delegation is used; one 
change refers to the equilibrium wholesale price, and the other change is the franchise 
fee. 
        In general, the wholesale price is found to be declining with the level of patience. 
Using a patient distributor who is willing to submit a high franchise fee in the first 
place, the producer tends to charge a low wholesale price. The low per unit price 
serves as an incentive to make the distributor more aggressive in deciding the level of 
output, and thereby forcing the other market producer to provide less. However, 
according to the value of the discount rate δ, two possible cases deserve further 
discussing in details.  
         The parameter   larger than one is the first and foremost case. Since the 
producers are supposed to have a discount factor equalling to one, the distributor is 
more patient than his producer if his discount rate is higher than one. We found that in 
this situation the producer under delegation can achieve higher profits than he can do 
in the Cournot setting. The higher profits can be attributed to three factors. One factor 
is directly linked to the high level of discount rate which is trivial; the second factor 
can be called borrowing effect; and the third factor refers to the reactions of the rival 
producer to this increased value of discount rate. 
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        The direct effect can be well explained simply by observing the composition of 
the franchise fee. In order to squeeze all the remaining profits from the distributor, the 
producer will set the franchise fee equivalent to the discounted amount of the 
distributor’s total profits across two periods so that the franchise fee is directly and 
positively linked to δ. With the same amount of money, the less patient producer can 
get better off if he can approach the money earlier than late. It is obvious that even 
with no adjustment of the wholesale price to its optimal level and still aligning it to 
the producing cost, the principal is able to achieve more profits by choosing a patient 
distributor who is ready for a high lump sum fee in advance. 
       The second factor can be attributed to the borrowing effect. If the distributor has 
more patience to wait for the future payoffs which equivalently implies a large 
discount rate, the less patient producer tends to charge an increased franchise fee 
compared with that in the direct effect beforehand and gradually return the money 
back to the more patient distributor through later subsidies for per unit sales. In this 
sense, the franchise fee can be regarded as the cheap “loan” the distributor gives to the 
producer which becomes feasible due to their varying degrees of patience. In 
exchange for a high franchise fee in advance, the principal pays out the money in the 
later rounds, which can be equivalently regarded as instalments. Compared with what 
we obtained in the direct effect case, the franchise fee is higher and the wholesale 
price is no longer equivalent to the producing cost but much less than the cost. This 
leads us to the third strategic effect. 
        The third effect is caused by the reactions of the rival producer to the larger than 
one discount rate. Being able to receive a large amount of money beforehand through 
the franchise fee from his distributor, the producer will set a lower wholesale price in 
return. Especially, the wholesale price is found to be less than the producing cost 
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when the discount rate is larger than one. This lower or even negative unit cost has 
successfully incentivized the distributor to take more aggressive actions in deciding 
how much to sell to the retailing market. The more patient the distributor is, the 
higher franchise fee the producer can collect beforehand, and consequently, the lower 
or even negative per unit price the distributor is provided in return which makes him a 
tough player when competing with the rival producer. As a rational player who can 
correctly predict the above reactions and behaviours which are brought by the high 
discount factor, the rival producer has to reduce own output in countering such 
quantity pressure with an attempt to maintain the price level and the highest possible 
profits he can obtain. The compromising reactions of the rival producer leave the 
principal a bigger share of the market and thereby a higher profit compared with the 
case where no delegation is used. 
        One more thing needs to be clarified here as for the interpretation of the case 
where discount factor is larger than one. It is hard to imagine a rational player should 
weigh the future payoffs much more than the current payoffs. Indeed, the second 
round of competition can represent multiple rounds of competition in the future and 
the second round payoff can be regarded as the total profits for all the future multiple 
rounds. In other words, the distributor put more weights on the profits of later 
multiple rounds while the principal values the current profits more. Against this 
background, it is natural for a patient distributor to pay a large amount of lump sum 
money in exchange for a low or even negative wholesale price afterwards. The 
franchise fee can be seen as a fixed cost and the wholesale price as variable cost so 
that a high fixed cost requires a high level of output which can be taken as the 
incentive tool. A onetime investment in the fixed cost allows the distributor to pay a 
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low variable cost. Intuitively, if the distributor expects that he can sell more outputs in 
the future, he will certainly be more active in paying for the prior high franchise fee. 
        We notice that the producer under delegation can finally occupy the entire 
market with his distributor as long as the discount rate reaches some critical value. 
The rival producer in this situation has to withdraw from the market because he is no 
longer able to sell any goods in front of such a tough competitor. The wholesale price 
turns out to be much less than the producing cost, suggesting that the producer, 
instead of receiving the money from his distributor, actually significantly subsidizes 
his downstream firm on a per unit basis in each later round. As a result, the distributor 
tries every effort to flood the market, which finally, will drive the rival producer out 
of the market. If the discount rate is beyond this critical value, the distributor can 
become no more aggressive and will still receive the same unit subsidy as in the 
monopoly case. However, despite staying in the monopoly quantity, the principal can 
acquire an increasing sum of money through the franchise fee due to the fact that it is 
positively associated with the discount factor. 
        The second case is δ less than one, implying that the distributor is less patient 
than the producer so that he cannot afford to wait for the future benefits. The 
wholesale price is larger than the producing cost and the franchise fee based on the 
discounted amount of future profits has to be reduced accordingly. The results in this 
case should be reversed with the case where δ is larger than one. 
        The second part of the model involves particular beliefs which are supposed to 
be dependent on the results of the first round competition the rival producer observed. 
With the same degree of patience, the final round outcomes are still Cournot 
equilibrium, i.e., delegation exerts no effects on the final round Nash Equilibrium 
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when contracts are unobservable; however, the intermediate results can be out of 
equilibrium by applying the particular beliefs; the distributor is found to sell more 
than the Cournot quantity to the market while the rival producer less, bringing in a 
larger intermediate profit to the principal. Observing the out of equilibrium outcomes 
in the intermediate stage, the rival producer can form different beliefs concerning the 
equilibrium. The linear belief used in this paper is one type of these possible beliefs. 
        By further allowing varying degrees of patience together with using the linear 
beliefs at the same time, not only the intermediate round but also the final round 
results have been significantly affected. The results are similar to the case where 
passive beliefs are supposed. All the variables at equilibrium are found to vary with 
the discount rate. When the discount rate reaches some critical value (which can be 
reasonably explained in a multiple rounds game we explained before), the principal 
can become a monopoly in the intermediate round and consequently achieve a 
monopoly profit. The franchise fee equates to the present value of the distributor’s 
total profits across two periods, which helps the principal retrieve the cost he pays out 
for subsidizing per unit “purchasing” of the distributor in the later rounds. The unique 
characteristic of this monopoly case differentiating with the case where passive 
beliefs are used is: the principal cannot always retain his market monopoly power by 
using the linear beliefs; while in the previous case where passive beliefs are used, the 
principal is able to acquire monopoly profits throughout both periods as long as the 
discount rate satisfies the minimum value requirement. 
        The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the literature review. 




2. Literature Review 
Rey and Stiglitz (1988) examined the effects on outcomes of vertical restraints 
between wholesalers and retailers in the price competition settings in terms of 
homogeneous goods. They found that vertical restraints can be used as a tool for the 
upstream producers to control the lower stream retailer; they also reached a 
conclusion that vertical restraints, used as a commitment, can effectively ease the 
price competition between producers by eliminating double marginalization problems 
under linear pricing method. The mechanic behind the working delegation lies in the 
two facts: the retail price only partially adjusts to the increase of wholesale price due 
to fierce competitions; it is beneficial for other retailers to follow the price increase 
despite that they accept the same low level cost from their wholesalers. Therefore, 
regardless of the use of franchise fees or simple linear price, the wholesalers in the 
upper stream can always charge a higher unit price.  
         However, all the conclusions Rey and Stiglitz arrived at are based on the 
assumptions that the retailers serve only as “response machines” in the game rather 
than being those who are fully rational so that they may conjecture, think, cheat and 
conduct some other positive behaviors. Besides, their analysis focused on the static 
situations which may not be complete and reflective of a real case.  
         In Rey and Stiglitz’s (1994) later working paper, they included exclusive 
territories in price setting game. Even without franchise fees, exclusive territories 
arrangement in vertical contracts is still a dominant strategy for both producers in 
terms of profits. Surprisingly, under some conditions, producers using franchise fee 
may achieve a lower payoff than without under exclusive territories. Their 
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explanation for this paradoxical result relies on the fact that retailers may adopt 
different pricing methods in dealing with varied contract arrangements.  
         Despite taking the retailers’ positive reactions into considerations this time, 
though, their study is still limited to one channel of the effects the delegation exert on 
producers; they also did not investigate whether the retailers will become more 
positive as to manipulate the current price or output as a signal to their rivals in 
dynamic models. If the exclusive territory is banned due to the anti-trust reasons, then 
the extra economic rents the delegation brings in to the producers will be dissipated in 
Rey and Stiglitz’s settings.  
        If the goods are not completely homogenous, the pricing strategy will also be 
affected by the differentiation of the goods in terms of substitutability. Various 
contract arrangements can be adopted based upon product differentiation. Under the 
linear assumption of demand function, constant unit cost and observable of demand 
before setting a detail price, Gal-Or (1990) concluded that if the substitutability of 
products is highly enough, then linear price should be the unique equilibrium due to 
the double marginalization characteristic although producers cannot extract all the 
profits of their retailers by simply charging a linear price; if products are largely 
differentiated, then franchise fees will be optimal for the producers because the 
competition among retailers are not so fierce. However, whatever the case is, resale 
price maintenance is always a dominated strategy and will never be adopted by 
producers. By measuring the cross price elasticity as the degree of substitutability, 
Gal-Or provides a simple but enlightening model in the field of vertical restraints; 
nevertheless, his conclusion that resale price maintenance is the worst choice in any 
situation is doubtful and questionable. It is not uncommon to see in our daily life that 
franchising stores always charge the same price for the same product across different 
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areas. A possible explanation for this phenomena can be that resale price maintenance, 
although it constraints the active response of retailers to its rivals, at least, can serve 
as an explicit and believable commitment while franchising fees sometime cannot.  
        In a contrast, Irmen (1997) presented a different view regarding the feasibility of 
linear price. He argued that even products are highly differentiated; it is still possible 
that linear price is adopted by producers at equilibrium under a specified demand 
technology. In a nutshell, delegation with a linear price arrangement is beneficial and 
desirable to producers if other non-linear price methods are banned by anti-trust laws 
or too costly to implement.  
        However, the competition not only exists at the horizontal level, but also exists at 
the vertical level, i.e., the competition between wholesalers and retailers vying for the 
distribution of industry profits. An increasing number and variety of goods have been 
produced in recent years, but the shelf space is rather limited. In this sense, 
manufacturers are disadvantaged relative to retailers for bargaining power so that their 
strategy has become to maximize their retailers’ profits instead of their own in order 
to sell out their products. Against this background, Shaffer (1991) introduced a 
inversed form of two-part tariffs to the vertical restraints study: Slotting allowances. 
Rather than receiving a fixed payment from its retailers, the producer, who falls in a 
complete competition situation, has to pay a lump-sum fees for the shelf space and 
correspondingly, charging a higher wholesale price as a way to extract profits. Despite 
both referring to a wholesale price larger than marginal cost and both have 
commitment value as to reducing the retailers competition, the essential difference 
between RPM and slotting allowances is that RPM limits the retail’s reaction to the 
rival’s behavior while slotting allowances, implying a high cost for retailers, though, 
can bring the retailers more profits under observable contract condition. If the contract 
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between wholesalers and retailers are observable, then slotting allowances will be the 
best choice for producers; if otherwise, RPM will be the best choice. In Shaffer’s 
study, although delegation makes no direct monetary payoff to the producers due to 
the complete competition environment, under particular contracts, such as slotting 
allowances and RPM, the commitment value of the contract facilitates leading to a 
higher price level among retailers, thus expanding the whole industry profit pie. In 
this sense, delegation is desirable for the industry and all players. As for the 
distribution of the profits among manufacturers and retailers, it depends on the market 
structure and bargaining power.  
        Katz (1991) further discussed the delegation problem but added a critical 
assumption that the contract between the principals and the agents cannot be observed 
by the outsider parties, and the latter can only form some conjectures about the 
contract terms. The outsider producers are supposed to be always correct about 
equilibrium. He concluded that delegation makes no difference on the final round 
competition outcome in terms of any Nash Equilibrium when the contracts between 
the principals and the agents cannot be observed by other producers. However, Katz 
did not rule out the situations where principals and agents have varying preferences 
for future payoffs, nor did he eliminate various types of beliefs taken by the outsider 
parties. After reinvestigating the results by incorporating a discount rate and assuming 
particular beliefs, we found that Katz’s conclusion no longer holds. 
        While beliefs were largely but inappropriately neglected in the previous 
researches, Rey and Verge (2003) pointed out that different beliefs under vertical 
contract considerably impact the existence of equilibrium and game results. In a one 
wholesaler and multi-retailers context, the upstream firm is always subjected to 
opportunism, i.e., offering a lower wholesale price or high quantity to some of his 
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retailers at the cost of breaking down the contracts with other retailers.  Two beliefs 
are defined in Rey and Verge’s (2003) paper. One is “Passive belief”, “whereby they 
expect the supplier to stick to the equilibrium contracts with their rivals even if it 
makes them an  out-of-equilibrium offer”; the other is called “Wary belief”: “when it 
receives an unexpected offer, a downstream firm when anticipates that the supplier 
acts optimally with its rivals, given the offer just received”. They argued that under 
passive belief, the unique equilibrium in Cournot setting is setting “w=c” (the 
wholesale price equals the producing cost) to all the retailers; however, no extra 
benefit for delegation is found in this case; while under price competition with wary 
belief, RPM (resale price maintenance) can be exerted, thus helping the producers 
restore monopoly profits. Rey and Verge’s study is insightful and valuable in 
involving the belief into the discussion of vertical contracts. Nevertheless, their 
research only considered the strategies a producer may take with respect to his 
retailers in monopoly case, whether their conclusion is valid in other market structures 
leaves as a problem.  
        Our paper extends the existing studies to the delegation problem under 
unobservable contracts by allowing diversified degrees of patience between the 
producers and the distributor, and by involving particular beliefs formulated by the 
outside producer who uses no agent. The paper differs with Katz’s in the conclusion. 
Under some specific assumptions, the delegation is found to result in a difference on 
the final equilibrium and bringing a higher profit to the principal.  
        We will start with a benchmark model which largely follows Katz’s proof in 
1991.  The model is later extended to include a discount rate to explain the effects of 
varying degrees of patience. We further extend the model by applying particular 
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beliefs not discussed in Katz’s paper. We finally examine the effects of delegation by 





















The game involves two producers 1U and 2U , 1U uses an agent 1D for delegating the 
goods in the market. Two stages are involved. The first stage is a contract stage, 1U  
offers a contract concerning the wholesale price w and the franchise fee F to 1D , the 
latter will accept the contract as long as his profit is nonnegative. In the second stage, 
2U  and 1D  compete in the retailing market in terms of quantity. After observing the 
competition results for the first round, they two again decide the sales levels for the 
second round of competition (which is supposed to be the last round of competition). 
However, a critical condition lies here is that the contract  Fw,  cannot be observed 
by the outside party 2U , so that he needs to formulate some beliefs about the 
wholesale price before entering into the second round of competition. The beliefs can 
present various types which may significantly influence our conclusions. We make 
insight investigations into two types of beliefs in this paper. The first type we 
examined in our model is passive beliefs, which is fixed and cannot be affected; the 
second type is linear beliefs by which we mean the equilibrium value of the wholesale 
price is linearly related to the first round competition result.  
        The following are assumptions and notations of the model which are used 
throughout the paper. The market demand is assumed to be linearly and inversely 
related to the total output.   bQAQP    21 qqQ   Both producers face the same 
marginal producing cost which is standardized to zero for simplicity. 1U  makes 
decisions on the  terms  Fw,  of the contract; 1D decides the first round output 1r  and 
the second round output 1q ; 2U decides the first round output 2r and the second round 
output 2q . The object of all the players is to maximize their profits. 
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3.1 Models with passive beliefs 
3.1.1 Passive beliefs & same degree of patience 
By saying “passive beliefs”, we imply that all the parties have consensus on the final 
round equilibrium of the game. Not knowing the wholesale price, 2U  takes the 
equilibrium value of w into his optimization function and this equilibrium value is a 
fixed figure not affected by any results he observed in the first round. “Same degree 
of patience” indicates that all the parties should be indifferent to the timing of the 
income streams. They put equal weight on the profit for each period. 
        In the second round of competition, 2U  supposes that there should be an 
equilibrium state of the wholesale price which is denoted as ew , so from his point of 
view, the problem in the second round is to solve: 
          
   

































        The first equation is what 2U  thinks about 1D will do. The latter faces a wholesale 
price w, which is assumed to be the equilibrium value in sU '2  eye. Because the 
franchise fee is sunk cost taken place after F is paid, it will not affect the decision 
making process for 1D . We remove the franchise fee from above equation. The second 
equation is the optimization function of 2U , who faces no wholesale price or franchise 
fee and his only cost is producing cost which is standardized to zero in our model. By 
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solving the two functions simultaneously, we obtain the outputs for the last round 
from sU '2  point of view so that they are found to rely on the equilibrium value of w.  
        For 1D , holding the same equilibrium assumption, he takes account for both 
factors, the true per unit cost he needs to pay to the principal, as well as sU '2 responses 
to such equilibrium supposition; 1D will actually choose an output level to satisfy: 
         
































decided by 2U . So, instead of the results perceived by 2U , the results for the second 
round of competition should be  2'1,qq  . 
        In the first round of competition, we suppose that 2U will not formulate any 
beliefs. Our purpose for making this assumption is to make the results comparable. In 
the later part of the model, the beliefs are assumed to be based on the results of the 
first round competition, so that we try to hold all other conditions constant except for 
the assumptions we specifically add. 
       2U  solves the following problem by taking 1r as given: 





















       As for D₁, he takes both rounds’ profits into consideration as early as he makes 
the first round output decision instead of deciding the output levels separately as 
what 2U has done, his maximization function is:   
       








        This equation incorporates results of both rounds, the actual results we solved for 
the last round and the best response we got for the first round. So we input the 
































        Furthermore, since the equilibrium wholesale price is fixed according to our 
assumption, it should be treated as a fixed number instead of a variable which needs 
to be decided. By solving the above first order condition, we obtain the output 
functions for the first round of competition which are reasonably found to be 
interdependent:
 



















        The first round results are not linked with the equilibrium value of w but with the 
true value of w, indicating that beliefs of the rival producer regarding the equilibrium 
value cannot influence the first round choices in any ways. 
        For 1U , he is supposed to set a franchise fee intended to extract all the remaining 
expected profits of his distributor 1D across two periods. The franchise fee eliminates 
any conflict of interests between the producer and the distributor. 
        
      1211211 qwqqbArwrrbAF D   
        As defined, the total profit of 1U is composed of two parts, one source of the 
profit is from per unit sales through the wholesale price w which is incurred in both 
rounds, and the other part stems from the franchise fee, a lump sum fee charged 
beforehand. Following is the principal’s total profit equation: 
          
 



























































































        As a rational player, U1 could predict what his distributor and his rival producer 
think about how the game is going on and what actions will be taken, so he input the 
results obtained from the other two players’ maximization functions into own profit 
optimization function. As the distributor does, instead of deciding the wholesale price 
and the franchise fee separately for each single period, he maximizes his total profits 
across two periods when he offers the contract to the distributor. 
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        We maximize the above equation by taking the first order condition with respect 
to w, which is a variable to be decided byU1, and at equilibrium, we find: 





  0 2121  ；
 
        The true value of the wholesale price is equivalent to the equilibrium price; both 
of them equates to the producing cost. The equilibrium outputs of both rounds for the 
two producers are found to be exactly the same.  
        The results are consistent with what Katz (1991) claimed that under 
unobservable contracts, delegation exerts no effects on the final equilibrium 
concerning the outputs and the wholesale price.  
        With the assumption of passive beliefs about the wholesale price together with 
the uniform degree of patience, the results in our benchmark model are found to be 
exactly the same as those in typical Cournot competition where no delegation is used. 
The wholesale price still equates to the producing cost which is set to zero, and the 
outputs for both periods are equivalent to Cournot outputs, implying that delegation 
cannot make the principal better off by taking two part tariffs when the contracts are 
unobservable. Furthermore, not only the final equilibrium outcomes, but also the 
intermediate stage results retain the same equilibrium as in the Cournot context 
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regardless of the use of delegation. In this sense, the principal should be indifferent to 
delegation or direct sales.  
3. 1.2 Passive beliefs & varying degrees of patience 
Not all the players value the future profits in the same way. It is likely that one values 
the future benefits less than what he can get presently. In reflection of such diversified 
nature of preferences, a discount rate is added to the distributor sD '1  second period’s 
profit while the two producers are supposed to have no time preferences so that they 
weight both periods’ profits equally. 
        The discount factor is generally supposed to fall within 0 and 1, reflecting the 
fact that money always has time value so that players prefer to receive the money 
today than tomorrow. In the case where the discount factor is larger than 1, the last 
period can be regarded as the representative of the future multiple rounds of 
competition, subsequently, the last round profits can be interpreted as the discounted 
value of future multiple rounds’ profits. With a long time horizon expectation, 1D  
affords to be patient to sacrifice some current benefits in exchange for more rounds’ 
payoff in the future. In this model part, we still suppose passive beliefs as in the 
benchmark case. 
        For the second round competition, the problem solving steps should follow those 
in the benchmark case for 2U , who incorporates the expected equilibrium value of w 
into his output decision making process; while for 1D , he has different preferences for 
the future profits and the current profits, so his second period profit is discounted to 
make him indifferent to current income and future income. In order to be the residual 
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claimant of all the remaining profits from the market sales, 1U will set the franchise 
fee equalling to the present value of sD '1 two periods’ profits as the following: 
        
      1211211 qwqqbArwrrbAF D    
        The franchise fee now includes the discount rate which is distinct from the 
franchise fee established in the benchmark case. 
        Although the total profits of 1U  are still made up of two parts, yet due to a 
changed franchise fee which is now depending on the discount rate, sU '1 total profit 
becomes to: 
        
          121121111 11 qqqbArrrbAqwFqrwU    
        We notice that, comparing to sU '1 total profit equation acquired in the benchmark 
case, two distinct points are found here. One point is that a discount rate is given to 
the second period profit while no discount rate is supposed in the previous case. As 
the distributor becomes highly impatient and heavily discounts the second round 
profit, the last part of the profit equation    121 qqqbA  will shrink; the other 
distinct point refers to the additional part   11 qw  . This “extra” profit can be 
attributed to different perceptions regarding future profits between the producer and 
the distributor. Contrarily to the first point, with a declining δ, the extra profit is rising. 
As the disparity of their preferences become large, the gap 1 will expand, and 
thereby the total profit of 1U will increase, on the condition that all other variable hold 
constant. 
        When the distributor values the second period’s profits as the same as the 
producer does (where 1 ), the extra profits will completely dissipate. In contrast, 
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when the distributor values the second period’s profits as nonsense (where 0 ), the 
producer can set a two part tariffs only for the first round profits while for the second 
round, he can only use a linear price based solely on the sales. If this should happen, 
the wholesale price for the first round should be different with that for the second 
round. The producer has to make price decisions separately to maximize the total 
profits. The game is divided into two distinctive parts rather than being continuous 
and dynamic. Since this is trivial, we will not go to details. It is also likely that the 
distributor values the second period’s profits more than the producer does 
(where 1 ), if this should happen, the principal actually becomes the payer side for 
the per unit “sales” and the last round of competition is the representative of future 
multiple rounds of competition. 
        In order to acquire more intuitions when the delta is larger than one, we further 
examine the above equation and explain it in more detail. 
        The case where the “discount rate” is greater than 1 can be easier to explain in a 
multiple rounds competition environment. The second period profit in our model can 
be perceived as the total present value of all the future multiple rounds’ profits. If the 
distributor is willing to play multiple rounds and can be patient to wait for the later 
rounds’ income, then the principal, rather than charging the distributor for per unit 
goods, will contrarily pay for such “purchasing” to his distributor for all the future 
multiple rounds. Expecting that he can receive the money back through later rounds 
sales and subsidies, the distributor is likely to pay a high franchise fee in the first 
place. 
       We notice that the “extra” profits will be reversed if delta is larger than one, 
indicating that the producer has to pay for every unit he sells to the distributor. 
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However, the last part of the profit equation    121 qqqbA   should get higher with 
an increasing δ.  
        Against this background, we can reasonably infer that even with no adjustment 
of the wholesale price to its optimal value under different discount factors (this means 
w=0), it is still possible for the principal to earn more profits from the single source of 
the franchise fee which is directly linked to the discount rate.  Referring to the above 
equation, the franchise fee is supposed to be the discounted value of the distributor’s 
total profits. If the discount rate grows, the franchise fee will follow such growth by 
nature.  
        Taking good use of preference differentiations, the principal actually borrows the 
money from his distributor in the first place in the form of a franchise fee. The 
wholesale price in the later multiple rounds can be regarded as the instalment through 
which the producer return the loans to his distributor. Such cheap and convenient 
borrowing makes the principal prefer a patient distributor when establishing the 
delegation relationship. This is the direct benefit caused by a high discount rate. 
        The optimization function of 1U is: 





        Input    2121 ,,, qqrr  acquired in the benchmark case into the above function, we 
obtain the true value of w which should be no surprisingly depending on the discount 
rate δ: 


















        Rather than being equivalent to the fixed producing cost with no considerations 
for any other factors, the wholesale price is found to be determined by the discount 
factor. The original equilibrium where the wholesale price equates to the producing 
cost becomes a specific case only when δ=1. The result indicates that the principal, 
who does not need to factor in any variables when deciding the unit price if there is 
uniform preference, now has to incorporate his targeted distributor’s degree of 
patience into the decision making process. 
        In addition, the wholesale price is also noticed to be relied on the exogenous 
variable A, which can be regarded as the total market size. Intuitively, the larger of the 
market is, the higher the price can be set holding all other conditions constant. 
        The negative first order condition of w with respect to  suggests that the 
distributor will be offered a low unit price from his upstream firm if he is patient to 
wait for the future income (a long time horizon is implicitly assumed with a high 
discount rate, especially for the situations where delta is larger than 1). The intuition 
behind such results is: a patient distributor is likely to submit a heavy amount of 
franchise fee in advance, which allows him to pay a low unit price for the later rounds. 
As for the upstream firm, who appears to be less patient than the distributor does, it is 
beneficial for him to receive a large amount of money beforehand and return some 
part of this amount back to the distributor in the form of a low unit charge in the later 
rounds. 
        Expecting to see a low wholesale price and a more aggressive distributor 
accompanied with a high delta, the rival producer has to reduce the output. This 
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strategic effect due to a high discount rate enables the principal to earn some 
additional profits relative to Cournot’s. 
        Input the result of w back into    2121 ,,, qqrr , we obtain: 









































        With an increasing δ, we find that output levels of 1D  for both periods become 
greater; the more the distributor values the future payoff, the more aggressive he can 
be by choosing a large quantity. This can be explained by sU '1 response to the high 
discount rate. Expecting a high discount rate, 1U will actually “borrow” the money 
from his distributor through the franchise fee in the first place, and later return a 
portion of the money back in the form of a low per unit price. With a low wholesale 
price, 1D  sets a low retail price, thus being able to provide a large quantity to the 
market. On the other hand, the rival producer, 2U  who can correctly make predictions 
concerning sD '1 behaviours and sU
'
1 responses under the high discount factor, has to 
reduce the production under sales pressure. This is the explanation for the adverse 
movement of 2r to δ. 
        However, there should be a low bound limit on 2r . 2r is reasonably restricted to 
be no less than zero, under which circumstances the rival producer has to keep 
reducing his output until he is no longer able to provide any goods to the market. If 
this extreme event should happen, 1U  finally develops to be a monopoly producer in 
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the market. While for 1D , he can become no more aggressive and always sells the 
monopoly output to the market regardless of his possible higher than critical patience 
level. In such extreme case where 02 r , we need following conditions to be satisfied: 














        In order to drive the rival producer out of the market, the principal needs to find 
some distributor whose discount rate is at least
7
13
, so that the distributor is willing to 
pay the heavy franchise fee in exchange for enjoying a relatively large amount of 
subsidies afterwards. The wholesale price in this extreme case is much less than zero, 
indicating that instead of being paid by the distributor, the producer, on a contrary, 
needs to subsidize the downstream firm on a per unit basis. In doing so, the principal 
can stimulate the distributor to dump as many goods as possible to the market. This is 
intuitive. The distributor’s income is totally from the subsidies based on the amount 
he sells. So the more the distributor sells, the more subsidies he can receive from his 
upstream firm. In the end, the producer and the distributor successfully occupy the 
entire market.  
        For the situation where δ is beyond the critical value
7
13
, the above results still 
hold because the principal has already covered the whole market and no additional 
benefits can be acquired if he expands the output so that has no incentive to sell more 
than the monopoly output. Nevertheless, as we explained before, the principal can 
simply expand the profit from a high franchise fee which is directly linked to the 
discount rate.  
27 
 
        From this model, it is obvious that the final equilibrium has been significantly 
altered and so do the intermediate results when we allow varying degrees of patience 
between the producers and the distributor under unobservable contracts. The 
wholesale price is no longer set to be the same as the marginal producing cost but 
completely determined by the extent to which the distributor weights the future profits; 
the final round equilibrium outputs are found to be depending on the discount rate 
rather than simply being the typical Cournot outputs. Therefore, we claim that under 
unobservable contracts where passive beliefs are used, delegation with different 
degrees of patience does have significant effects on the equilibrium; moreover, it is 
possible for the principal to acquire additional profits by using a patient distributor.
  
3.2 Models with particular beliefs 
The fact that beliefs are not specifically stressed and simply perceived to be passive in 
the previous models indicates that even though the first round outputs turn out to be 
different with what 2U  originally expected, he will never doubt that 1U has made a 
mistake in deciding the wholesale price. Rather, this deviation is believed to be 
caused by 1D  and it is temporarily which will reverse to his conjectured results. This 
has two implications. First, the rival producer 2U  will always stick to his original 
beliefs about the equilibrium value and never change it. Second, Cournot equilibrium 
always holds in the last round. The reason comes from the fact that by no means can 
1U  affect sU
'
2 beliefs or behaviours through manipulating the intermediate outputs, so 
that the final outcomes will inevitably reverse to the original equilibrium, which is 
proved to be optimal for both parties and no one has unilateral incentive to deviate. 
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        While passive beliefs appear plausible, it is also likely that beliefs vary with the 
early round results. For comparison purposes, the notion of particular beliefs based on 
the first round results are proposed for the following models, i.e., 2U  formulates his 
expectations of equilibrium value of w according to the results he observed in the first 
round competition, by taking this conjectured w into account, 2U  decides his second 
round output level. Therefore, what 1D  chooses in the first round not only affects the 
outcomes in that single round but also affects the results in the second round by 
affecting the expectations of 2U  , and thereby changing sU
'
2 behaviours in the later 
rounds. With this specific setting, we try to investigate that when the rival producer’s 
beliefs are altered by the distributor’s first round choice, whether the Cournot 
equilibrium still holds and whether the principal can obtain additional profits by 
manipulating the first round output. It is natural for beliefs presenting various forms; 
difference in beliefs just reflects different out-of–equilibrium beliefs so that we cannot 
say one type of beliefs is superior to the other. For simplicity, we suppose in the 
following models that beliefs are linearly linked with the first round 
output 2U observed, and such linear beliefs is one type of possible beliefs hold by 2U . 
        Against this background, we work with two cases; the first case supposes all the 
players value the future payoffs in the same way, and in the second case, varying 
degrees of patience is introduced. 
3.2.1 Linear beliefs & same degree of patience 
In order to clarify the decision making process for the three players under the linear 
beliefs setting with unobservality, we make time assumptions as follows. 
         Time assumptions: 
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1. In the contract stage 1U offers a contract  Fw, to 1D  
2. After the contract is accepted based on the non-negative profit rule, 
1D and 2U enter into competition immediately in terms of quantity  21,rr  
3. After observing the results for the first round, 2U  formulates some 
particular beliefs about the equilibrium value of w , which are linear beliefs by 
assumption, he thought that at equilibrium: 1rw
e   . β is reasonably to be 
less than zero because the higher output the rival producer observed in the first 
round, the low wholesale price he predicts for the distributor. Taking such 
beliefs into both players’ decision making processes, 1D and 2U  compete again 
in terms of quantity  21,qq  
        We solve the game backwards. For the second round competition, U2 thinks that 
D1 will maximize his second round profit by solving: 
         








Since U2 cannot observe the true cost D1 faces, he has to instead incorporate his 
anticipations of the wholesale price into the optimization function.
 
        2U maximizes his own profit for the second round simply by taking the best 
response: 
          
































        But for 1D  who knows his true cost and is able to infer sU
'
2 responses, he will 
actually solve the following optimization function for the second round: 
         








w is the true wholesale price 1D needs to pay to the producer; because 1D can correctly 
infer sU '2 anticipations and subsequent reactions, he will apply the result 





q    into his optimization function. Therefore, 1D will 











q   . 
        Intuitively, 2U makes his output decision depending on his conjecture about the 
equilibrium wholesale price; due to the fact that their decisions are interdependent, 
1D has to take account for what 2U  expects about him and corresponding reactions. 
This is the reason why 1q is dependent on both w and
ew . 




r   
which can be obtained by solving the following first order condition: 
        










        However, for 1D , it is dawn on him that by carefully choosing his first round 
output, he can manipulate the rival’s expectations and subsequently affects the rival’s 
behaviours in the second round of competition. Hence, rather than optimizing single 
period’s profit, 1D has instead maximized his total profits for both periods as early as 
in the first round by choosing 1r  satisfying: 
         








 We obtain the following result: 
       
























Invert  wr1 to solve for  1rw
e : 



















Obviously, the equilibrium value of w is based on the first round results of  21,rr . 
This is consistent with what we supposed. 
        By matching the above result with the expectation of 2U  about w   1rwe   , 
we have: 















 is based on the market size A which is determined exogenouly as well as based on 
the result of 2r , which should be determined endogenously.  is less than zero, 
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implying that the more the first round output provided by 1D 2U  observes , the smaller 
wholesale price 2U thinks about 1D facing. This is intuitive and consistent with our 
assumptions. A low wholesale price makes it possible for 1D to set a low retail price, 
which in turn incentivize him to provide more goods to the market. Therefore, 
if 2U observes a high output by the rival distributor in the first round, he can 
reasonably predict that the latter faces a low per unit cost. This is the distinctive 
characteristic of the particular beliefs with the passive beliefs. 
        In the contract stage, 1U  who could infer the behaviours and reactions of the 
other two players, will indeed make decisions on a total profit basis instead of making 
separate price decisions for each period. The franchise fee is set in the following form 
to extract all the remaining profits of 1D for both periods: 
        
      1211211 qwqqbArwrrbAF D     
      sU '1 total profit comes from two sources. One is brought by per unit sales which 
occur in both periods by charging w. In addition, the lump sum fee F also contributes 
to the profit composition: 
        
        121121111 qqqbArrrbAFqrwU   
        Until now, it is clear that the three players make their decisions corresponding to 
the other two players’ anticipations and reactions. All the decisions and results are 
found to be interdependent. The principal’s decisions on price will affect the 
distributor’s purchasing level, while the latter will have an impact on the rival 
producer’s expectations about the equilibrium value of the wholesale price, which in 
turn leads to changes in the rival producer’s output decisions for the second round of 
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competition. The principal has to take this long chain of reactions and consequences 
into consideration when he makes decisions on the wholesale price and the franchise 
fee in the first place. In this sense, no player can solve for their optimization problems 
isolate; while with passive beliefs under unobservality, the outcomes for the early 
rounds can be independent of the equilibrium value of the price. Therefore, with 
linear beliefs, the three variables 21 , rr and w at equilibrium have to be solved at the 
same time.  
We solve the following equations simultaneously for 21,, rrw : 

























































We have the following results at equilibrium: 



















,0 21  
 
        The wholesale price, with linear beliefs but assuming the same degree of 
patience, is found to be equivalent to the producing cost which is zero by assumptions. 
Such result is consistent with the original equilibrium acquired in Cournot 
competition setting. However, the intermediate stage results are found to be deviated 
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from Cournot’s. In the intermediate stage, D1 tends to provide a higher level of output 
while U2 lower comparing to typical Cournot outputs.
 





21  . These results are 
typical Cournot outputs. 
       When the wholesale price is set to zero, the profit of 1U totally stems from the 











   
        Despite applying the linear beliefs which are assumed to be relied on the early 
round results, the final equilibrium regarding the wholesale price and outputs still 
holds, which supports what Katz claimed in 1991 that delegation, by using two part 
tariffs, can exert no effects on either the final equilibrium outputs or the wholesale 
price under unobservality.  
        However, output results for the intermediate stage have been noticeably altered 
by such linear beliefs. 1D  is found to sell more and 2U less compared with the amount 
in typical Cournot competition where two producers compete directly in terms of 
quantity with no use of delegation. One question arises with such changes in the 
intermediate stage: how this happens? 
        For the intermediate stage, the distributor is tempted to flood the market and his 
sales level is obviously beyond the equilibrium output level provided that he is 
charged a low cost for per unit goods. Expecting the distributor’s aggressive 
behaviours, the rival producer has to reduce his output for that round in an attempt to 
retain the market price and profits. By charging a wholesale price equivalent to the 
marginal producing cost, 1U has successfully encouraged 1D to take a highly 
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aggressive attitude in competing with 2U , who is forced to provide less to the market 
in the first round competition. If the distributor knows that he cannot influence the 
rival producer’s anticipation in any ways, he has no incentives to unilaterally deviate 
from the Cournot equilibrium since the latter is already the best choice for him. 
        The results once more support what Katz claimed in his 1991 paper that 
delegation cannot change the equilibrium results under unobservable contracts when 
two part tariffs is applied.  
        Nevertheless, by switching the beliefs types from passive to linear, changes can 
take place in the intermediate stage in the output levels. By taking use of the linear 
beliefs of the rival producer, the principal can obtain a higher profit from distributor’s 
successfully selling a larger quantity.  
3.2.2 Linear beliefs & varying degrees of patience 
As in the benchmark model, we allow for different degrees of patience in our second 
case under linear beliefs assumption. A discount rate  is given to sD '1  second period 
profit while for the two producers, since they are supposed to perceive the future and 
current payoffs in the same way in our model so that no discount rate is put on their 
second rounds’ profits. 
        The last period game playing should be no different, so that we have exactly the 
same results as with the previous case where linear beliefs are used but same degree 










q    
        For 1U , who makes decisions on a total profit basis rather than separately 
between two rounds, he will set a franchise fee equalling to the present value of 
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sD '1 total profits across two periods, thus leaving no remaining profits to his 
distributor: 
         
      1211211 qwqqbArwrrbAF D    
        From above equation, we could infer that when holding all other variables 
constant, a simple increase in discount rate delta will bring the principal a higher 
franchise fee even still setting the wholesale price w to producing cost zero. This is 
direct effects caused by an increasing delta.  
        By differentiating sD '1 profit (the above equation) with respect to 1r  and applied 
the results of  21,qq  into the objective function, we notice that the result 1r  is based on 
the amount of sU '2 sales 2r as well as the true unit cost w he needs to pay to 1U ; it also 
depends on the discount rate δ: 











































Invert  wr1 to solve for  1rw
e : 























































































The wholesale price is based on three variables: ,, 21 rr  
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        At equilibrium,  1rw
e has to match the linear beliefs we supposed in the first 
place: 1rw
e   . In doing so, we reach the results regarding  , : 





































































        Both parameters are determined by the discount rate delta. The result implies that 
the beliefs of the equilibrium wholesale price are dependent on how much the 
distributor values the future payoffs. Beliefs are affected by the characteristics of the 
distributor. This is intuitive. A person’s beliefs are inevitably affected by the type the 
person belongs to. 
        Input these results into 21,qq , we obtain the following results: 





























        The second round outputs are linked to the first round results, the true value of w 
and the beliefs of w as well. 
        So the total profits of 1U  takes the following form: 
        
          121121111 11 qqqbArrrbAqwFqrwU    
        This general equation for sU '1 profit is the same as the equation we previously 
obtained in the case where varying degrees of patience are introduced but with 
passive beliefs. Even though the wholesale price remains at producing cost level 
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where 0w and FU 1 , the principal is still able to make higher profits simply by 
charging a higher franchise fee. This is feasible when δ becomes larger. A distributor 
with a higher level of patience relative to the producer actually loans the money to the 
principal in advance in the form of franchise fee. Delegation makes the less patient 
principal better off by charging an increased franchise fee from a more patient 
distributor due to their varying degrees of patience even giving no considerations to 
the wholesale price. 
        However, being a rational player, the principal 1U will not miss any profitable 
opportunities, so that he will in fact adjust the wholesale price to its optimal level and 
thereby leaving no profits to 1D . 
        Input 211 ,, qqr into sU
'
1 profit function, we obtain   ,,,, 21 rwU , by 
differentiating which with respect to w, we have the formation of w: 











        The true wholesale price is also found to be moving with the discount rate. 
Following the same logic as in the previous case, no player can take independent 
actions without taking account for the other two players’ responses. Therefore,
 
,,,,,, 2121 wrrqq should be decided interdependently and thus are required to be 
solved at the same time. 
        By solving ,,,,,, 2121 wrrqq simultaneously, we obtain the results as following: 
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        Observing above general forms of various variables, we notice that all the 
variables become depending on the discount rate δ, suggesting that the original 
equilibrium no longer prevails with the assumptions of varying degrees of patience 
instead of uniform preferences. 
        2r  is found to be decreased with δ, but it cannot decline without any restrictions. 
It should be constrained to some low bound limit that is reasonably set to zero, where 
1U successfully exerts monopoly power in the market. To satisfy the principal being a 














linear beliefs, the principal has to seek for some distributor who has a discount rate at 
least as high as 2.0362 to help him gain the monopoly power.
 
        Inputting these results into other variables, we have the following results for the 






































α is relied on the market size A, and β is required not only to be negative but also 
needs to be larger than b in terms of absolute value, while b represents the sensitivity 
of market price responding to the total output. This implies that the expected 
wholesale price should be more sensitive to the first round result than the market price 
to the total output. 
        Not so surprisingly, w has a negative sign, suggesting that the distributor will 
receive money on a per unit basis from his principal for delegation. In this sense, w is 
no longer a wholesale price but actually serves as a subsidy paid to the distributor 
who delegates the sales for the principal in the market. This subsidy functions as a 
stimulus for the distributor to behave aggressively. Because except for the franchise 
fee paid beforehand, which could be perceived as a sunk cost that cannot be recovered, 
no further cost occurs. The more the distributor sells to the market, the more subsidies 
he can receive from the principal without incurring additional costs. 
        The franchise fee is found to be much higher (more than two times higher) than 
the profit. The high franchise fee can be explained by two effects. One is the strategic 
effect. Expecting the incoming actions taken by the distributor who has a high 
discount rate, the rival producer is forced to cut off the output to maintain the price, 
thus making it possible for the principal to charge a high franchise fee by expanding 
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the sales at the distributor’s level; the other effect is direct and intuitive. The franchise 
fee is supposed to be the discounted amount of the distributor’s all future rounds’ 
profits. In this sense, the franchise fee is directly linked to the discount rate, 
consequently, growing with an increasing delta. 
        Furthermore, although 2U  can provide nothing to the market in the intermediate 
stage as long as the discount rate satisfies the minimum critical value, yet he is able to 
acquire a small portion of the market share in the final round competition. However, 
the final equilibrium outcomes are still found to be deviated from the outcomes in 
Cournot competition setting. In the long run, the rival producer may detect such 
manipulation to some extent, so that he may try to enter into the market with a low 
level of sales. 
        If δ is less than the critical value, then we have the following results: 























        With growing patience of the distributor, the principal is able to charge a high 
franchise fee from the patient distributor and thereby compromising on the per unit 
price, this explains the result that w decreases with δ;
 
logically, a lower wholesale 
price is encouraging a more aggressive action in terms of output, that is why we 
see 11 ,qr are positively related to δ; correctly predicting a high discount rate and the 
consequent aggressiveness of the distributor, the rival producer 2U  has to cut off the 
output under quantity pressure, leading to a negative relationship of 22 ,qr with δ. Since 
the franchise fee is supposed to be the discounted amount of sD '2 total profits, it is 
intuitive to see that F grows with the discount rate. On the one hand, a rising δ 
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brings 1D a higher total profit by forcing the rival producer to provide less; on the 
other hand, 1U is able to earn more simply by borrowing the money through franchise 
fee from his distributor which can be attributable to a high discount rate. Delegation 
could become more profitable for the principal as he chooses a highly patient agent. 
        A question naturally arises concerning the situation where δ is above the critical 
value. Since the principal has already become the single provider in the market, he has 
no incentive to expand the output. The wholesale price or the subsidy for each unit 
goods should be the same with the case where δ equates to its critical value, and the 
output level of both producers should also be the same as the monopoly case where δ 
just touches the critical value. However, the principal’s profit will remain growing 
with the discount rate from charging a high franchise fee. Because a high discount 
rate implies a longer time horizon, the principal can acquire more rounds’ profits 
under this circumstance. 
        We are now confident to claim that delegation under assumptions of linear 
beliefs together with varying degrees of patience does have a significant effect on the 
final equilibrium outcomes as well as on the intermediate stage results. In addition, 









We conclude that regardless of types of beliefs we apply, the final round equilibrium 
concerning the wholesale price and the output levels will always hold the same as that 
in Cournot competition setting under unobservable contracts, provided that the 
principals and the distributor have same degree of patience. However, the 
intermediate stage outcomes can go out of equilibrium.  
        However, if we introduce varying degrees of patience into the delegation 
problem, not only the intermediate stage results, but also the final round equilibrium 
is found to be significantly altered. All the results, the wholesale price, the outputs in 
terms of Nash Equilibrium become to depend on how much the distributor discounts 
the future payoffs and consequently Cournot equilibrium no longer holds. 
        We re-interpret Katz’s conclusion in our benchmark model by simply applying 
passive beliefs together with the assumption of a uniform degree of patience among 
players. Our results are consistent with what Katz claimed that delegation under 
unobservable contracts can make no difference on the final equilibrium of the game. 
The wholesale price is found to be the same as the marginal producing cost and the 
franchise fee is set for extracting the present value of total profits from the distributor. 
Both producers are found to provide Cournot output to the market in the intermediate 
stage as well as in the final round competition. 
        By allowing varying degrees of patience, not only the intermediate stage results 
but also the final equilibrium has been significantly influenced. As the discount rate 
increases, the distributor being more patient as for future rounds’ profits, he is more 
likely to be charged a high lump sum fee in advance. The patient distributor can 
gradually retrieve the money from later rounds’ subsidies on a per unit base. In the 
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extreme case where the discount rate reaches the critical value, the rival producer can 
be forced out of the market and the principal can exert monopoly power in both 
rounds of competition. In this situation, the second period represents multiple rounds 
of competition in the future, where the distributor expects a long time horizon for 
their delegation relationship.  
        We check the linear beliefs in our second part of the model. With the same 
degree of patience, the final equilibrium still holds but the intermediate results have 
been greatly changed; the distributor tends to provide a higher level of output while 
the other producer lower compared with the equilibrium Cournot quantity, and 
thereby bringing additional profits to the principal. In this sense, although delegation 
cannot alter the final round outcomes, it can at least temporarily change the 
intermediate behaviors, resulting in a higher output level and accompanying increased 
profits for the principal. 
        In the last case, we incorporate two assumptions, linear beliefs and varying 
degrees of patience simultaneously into the model with an attempt to investigate their 
combined effects on the equilibrium and profits. Instead of being equivalent to 
marginal producing cost, the wholesale price in this case depends on the discount rate; 
In addition, the output levels of both producers are found to be relied on the discount 
rate. Furthermore, the franchise fee the distributor accepts equates to the present value 
of his total profits across two periods. In the extreme, the principal can be the sole 
provider in the market as long as the discount rate is above some critical value. 
Nevertheless, the rival producer will finally enter into the market, sharing a relatively 
smaller part of the total industry pie. 
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        Finally, further research may extend the exploration in several aspects.  First, 
other types of beliefs can be introduced into the model. Beliefs can present various 
forms besides the particular beliefs we discussed. Second, the market structure can be 
extended to include more producers and distributors to make the conclusion widely 
applicable. However, the researchers need to be cautious about the products 
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